But not all discussion of “use of an auto” cases need focus on the oddball facts (as I enjoy doing). There are serious legal issues at work too. Two lawyers from Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith recently did a very fine job demonstrating, in a Law360 piece, that a serious discussion of the legal issues can be had as well.

According to Michael R. Velladao and Nicole R. Kardassakis, of LBB&S’s Los Angeles office, the Ninth Circuit, in Gradillas v. Lincoln General Insurance Company, 792 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2015), recently certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: “When determining whether an injury arises out of the ‘use’ of a vehicle for purposes of determining coverage under an automobile insurance policy and an insurance company’s duty to defend, is the appropriate test whether the vehicle was a ‘predominating cause/substantial factor’ or whether there was a ‘minimal causal connection’ between the vehicle and the injury?”

Mr. Velladao and Ms. Kardassakis see the answer to this question as potentially leading to a significant increase in the extent to which “use of an auto” is satisfied for purposes of an auto policy.

Specifically at issue in Gradillas is whether “use of an auto,” under an auto policy, is satisfied where a bus driver rapes a woman while on a bus, where the driver had moved the bus to a secluded area prior to committing the crime.

As the LBB&S lawyers describe it, California has long applied a stringent “substantial factor” test for determining whether an alleged bodily injury “arose out of” the use of the vehicle. But the authors believe that this could all change on account of the issue certified to the California high court. They describe what could happen, if the less stringent standard is adopted, like this:

“The Ninth Circuit’s question sets the stage for potentially expanding the interpretation of what constitutes the use of a vehicle from what is — the substantial factor test — to what could be — the minimum causal connection test. If the California Supreme Court adopts the more fluid minimum causal connection test, a vehicle would no longer have to serve as the instrumentality in causing the alleged injury or damage. Rather, all that would be required is a simple connection between the alleged injury or damage and use of the vehicle. Hence, so long as the use of the vehicle facilitated the alleged injury or damage, coverage would be afforded under the insuring agreement of an auto policy. This change would not only upset nearly half a century of legal precedent, but would also dramatically expand the coverage afforded under automobile policies. Such an expansion would impose upon insurers the obligation to provide coverage for all injuries having a minimum causal connection to the use of a vehicle — coverage for which the insurers did not bargain.”

[Of course, “use of an auto” is (or should be) a zero sum game. In other words, if it is easier to satisfy “use of an auto” for purposes of an auto policy’s grant of coverage, then it should likewise be easier to satisfy the “use of an auto” exclusion in a general liability or homeowners policy. However, it seems pretty obvious that auto policies play a much bigger role in the context of automobile accidents than CGL and homeowners policies. So the authors are certainly focused on the more important side of the equation.]